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The risky truth of fabulation: Deleuze, Bergson and 




Based on a close reading of relevant works of Gilles Deleuze, and informed by Emile 
Durkheim and Henri Bergson's writings on religion, this paper articulates a novel 
concept of 'fabulation' which has significant implications for psychosocial theory. 
Beginning with a discussion of Jean Rouch's classic film ‘Les Maîtres Fous’, a 
distinction is drawn between a Deleuzian vision of fabulation as a profound fiction at 
the heart of the real, and an objectifying version which always contrasts fabulation 
with a supposedly external standard of reality. This latter version is clearly expressed 
in the literature of the psy-disciplines, but is also expressed in cultural forms such as 
the 'cinema of reality'. After sketching the connections between Deleuze’s more risky 
yet also profound version of fabulation, Rouche’s ‘cinéma vérité’, and Scholes’ 
‘fabulator’ tradition in literature (Vonnegut, Durrell, Navakov etc.), this concept of 
fabulation is traced back to Bergon's critical encounter with Durkheim over the 
question of the sacred. With help from the recent work of Ronald Bogue, the paper 




This does not mean that madness is the only language common to the work of 
art and the modern world...; by the madness that interrupts it, a work of art 
opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without answer, provokes a 
breach without reconciliation where the world is forced to question itself 
(Foucault 1973, p. 288).  
 
1. Introduction: The Mad Masters  
 
With footage shot using a hand-held camera, the viewer is shown the bustling city 
streets of Accra, then capital of Africa’s Gold Coast. A French narrator introduces 
the viewer to several different categories of labourer at work: the dockers at the port, 
those who clear the gutters, mine the tin, etc. The film then takes the viewer to a rural 
location at which a selection of these workers proceed to enact a religious practice, 
with origins in Niger, called Hauka. Nominated initiates perform a circular dance to 
the tune of a one string violin and percussion. A substance-assisted trance ritual 
follows in which selected participants, wide-eyed and sometimes frothing at the 
mouth, become possessed by what the narrator describes as figures associated with 
the British colonial rulers of the region. A man possessed by the Corporal of the 
Guard rises and jerkily shakes hands with those present, carrying a piece of wood 
shaped like a rifle. As the Corporal flails and staggers around, Gerba the train 
conductor comes striding through the trees into the clearing, frothing at the mouth 
and clutching his shorts, making loud retching sounds before collapsing in front of a 
circular stone bloodied by a sacrificed bird. Captain Malia, who had been seated with 
eyes rolling, lurches to his feet and begins a slow parody of a military march. Various 
leadership challenges follow until, after much commotion, a round-table is called, 
featuring the sacrifice and eating of a dog, some eaten raw, and some boiled in a pot 
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from which the flesh is pulled with bare hands. The film ends with the people driving 
home to resume their ordinary working lives, with shots mundane work juxtaposed 
with flashbacks of the same people enacting the ritual.      
 
The passage above is a synopsis of Jean Rouch’s highly controversial and much 
debated 1955 film ‘Les Maîtres Fous’. As well as being an ethnographer, Rouch 
pioneered the cinematic genre known as ‘cinéma vérité’. Some consider this film the 
preeminent anti-colonial movie. Its title ‘The Mad Masters’ expresses the perspective 
of Rouch’s narration to the effect that the Hauka parodies the manners and 
ceremonies of the colonial rulers, scrambling the codes of the asymmetrical power 
relations between white colonial authority and black subjugation. Although this 
interpretation has been challenged, it is supported by the fact that it was immediately 
banned by the colonial rulers. Others, however, wanted the film burned because of the 
way it reinforces Western stereotypes about African people (Lim, 2002).  
 
My intention is not to attempt a judgement that might settle this controversy. Rather, I 
begin with Rouch’s work because of the significant role his ‘cinéma vérité’ plays in 
Chapter 6 of Gilles Deleuze’s book Cinema 2 (1989), entitled ‘the powers of the 
false’. That chapter discusses a change that occurred within cinema through the 
‘cinéma vérité’ of Rouch, the ‘cinema of the lived’ pioneered by Pierre Perrault, and 
the ‘direct cinema’ of Shirley Clarke and Cassavetes. For Deleuze, this change was 
effectively the discovery within cinema of a profound insight that had also flashed 
upon Nietzsche. In Deleuze’s (1989, p.149) words, the core of this insight is that: ‘the 
ideal of the true was the most profound fiction, at the heart of the real’. I will return 
shortly to examine the meaning of this quotation from Deleuze in more detail, but for 
now I use it - and the Mad Masters - as a way of introducing the concept that will be 
the focus of this article: fabulation. Any most profound fiction at the heart of the real 
must be fabulated. 
 
In what follows I extend my recent work (Stenner, 2017a) and offer an account of 
fabulation that I hope will be useful for scholars working at the transdisciplinary 
interface between psychology and Deleuzian philosophy (see also Barr, 1992, 
Braidotti, 2000, Brown, 2010, Kruger and Le Roux, 2017, Nichterlein and Morss, 
2017). Fabulation is not one of Deleuze’s core concepts and is perhaps not a fully-
fledged concept at all.  In fact, unlike better-known Deleuzo-Guattarian (1988) 
inventions like becoming animal, de/re/terrritorialization and line of flight, Deleuze 
uses ‘fabulation’ rarely and in a fragmentary manner. My discussion of fabulation 
builds upon literary scholar Ronald Bogue’s (2006, 2010) excellent efforts to piece 
together these fragments.1 Bogue’s main concern is to see if his assemblage can 
illuminate some recent novels (which it certainly can). I build on this through a 
number of steps. First, I provide a rapid overview of how psychology has 
‘disciplined’ the concept of fabulation through a contrast enabled by an objective 
disciplinary standard. I then show how variations on this same disciplinary device are 
discernable, first in what Deleuze calls ‘the cinema of reality’ and, second, in 
Durkheim’s sociology of religion. I present the latter as an important but rarely 
acknowledged influence upon Bergson’s account of fabulation, which inspired 
Deleuze. Finally, my aim is to show the sense in which Deleuzian fabulation affirms a 
                                                
1 I would like to thank Maria Nichterlein for alerting me to Bogue’s work. 
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creative and transdisciplinary relation to the truth that is more ‘risky’ than the 
disciplinary approach allows.  
 
2. The Masters of Madness: Fabulation in the ‘psy’ sciences 
 
Bogue defines fabulation as follows: 
 
Fabulation… is closely associated with fiction, invention and the ‘power of 
the false’… [it] comes from the Latin fabula, which may be rendered as ‘talk’, 
‘conversation’, or ‘small talk’, but also as ‘story’, ‘tale’, ‘myth’, or ‘legend’. 
In this regard, fabula resembles its Greek counterpart, mythos, which may be 
translated as ‘word’, ‘speech’, ‘story’, or ‘legend’… La Fable, according to 
the Robert dictionary, may refer to ‘the set of mythological stories as a whole’ 
(2006, p. 214).  
 
The word fabulation evokes the ‘fable’ and carries forward the connotation of a folk 
story that is not intended to be taken as true because of certain evidently unbelievable 
components. The word ‘fabulous’ shares the same root for similar reasons. Aesop’s 
fables, for example, involve fabulous animals engaging in activities nobody would 
seriously expect of animals. Perhaps the point of a fable is that everyone knows that it 
is not ‘true’ in the sense that mice don’t really talk to lions and help them escape from 
nets, and foxes don’t really give soup to storks. If the teller of fables is nevertheless 
able to express something true, then perhaps this is not despite, but because of this 
freedom from the demand to faithfully relate actual events in their material unfolding. 
It might even be said that the distance afforded by fabulous animals protects the 
‘truth’ of the fable by pulling it into closer proximity. But this ‘fabulous truth’ is not 
the ‘correctness’ usually implied when people think of a representation which 
accurately matches its object. Fabulous truth, unlike representational correctness, 
carries no guarantees of veridicality and in fact is never far from falsehood. The first 
words spoken to Hesiod by the Muses of Mount Helicon, for example, were a clear 
announcement of this risky relationship: ‘Rustic shepherds, worthless reproaches, 
mere stomachs, we know how to say many lies like the truth, and, whenever we wish, 
we know how to tell the truth.’ (Hesiod, and Caldwell, 1987, p. 27). As we shall see, 
this ambivalent and risky relation to truth is lost entirely from the concept of 
fabulation crafted within the ‘psy’ sciences. 
 
In the context of psychology and the ‘psy’ sciences more generally, fabulation shares 
a family resemblance with a range of concepts including suggestibility, imitation, 
confabulation and, to some extent, somatization. Jean Piaget (1972, p. 202), for 
example, used the term ‘fabulation’ in the context of child development to indicate a 
phase during which children have difficulties distinguishing ‘between fabulation and 
truth’, ending, he proposed, at around 7 or 8 years of age. Piaget’s usage can be 
considered paradigmatic of the approach from the ‘psy’ sciences in so far as 
fabulation is construed solely from the perspective of deviations from accurate 
cognition. Far from being a means for truth, fabulation becomes its opposite.  
This same feature applies to the closely related notion of ‘confabulation’ which was 
introduced into psychiatry by Emil Kraepelin (1886). Confabulation indicates a 
pathological condition where patients provide or act upon information that is 
evidently false or context-inappropriate. Since patients who confabulate are unaware 
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of this situation, Moscovitch (1989) coined the alternative phrase ‘honest lying’. It is 
relevant to note that fabulation and confabulation share this feature of being ‘honest’ 
deviations from accurate cognition with the medical concept of somatisation. In the 
discourse of psychosomatic medicine, the somatiser, unlike the malingerer, is not 
deliberately misleading the physician about the symptoms they report, but genuinely 
experiences them, despite lack of demonstrable disease (Greco, 2012). In this sense, 
both somatisation and psychiatric confabulation have connections with delusion, since 
all involve the unintentional production of false propositions (Berrios, 2000). A 
confabulation is an honest addition (a ‘production’) to a report of an experience and 
not just a reporting error. Failing to report something that did happen is not 
confabulation (Carruthers, 2018). Some clinicians, however, would characterise 
delusion as a disorder of belief formation whilst confabulation pertains to memory. 
The point I wish to extract here, however, is that fabulation and confabulation are 
considered within psychology either as immature (as in the case of Piaget) or as 
pathological (as in the case of Kraepelin) conditions.  
When considered a matter of pathology, origins are sought either directly in organic 
damage to prefrontal structures, basal forebrain, temporal lobes or the anterior limbic 
system, or, alternatively, within the situational demands of highly stressful situations.  
When considered – qua Piagetian fabulation – a matter of immaturity, fabulation 
shades into the notion of suggestibility where, for obvious reasons, it has played a key 
role in debates around false memories and the suitability of children as witnesses in 
courts of law (see Motzkau, 2009, Brown and Stenner, 2009, Brown and Reavey, 
2015 for critical accounts). Suggestibility, however, primarily suggests a 
susceptibility to influence from what others may have made up, although the word is 
also used to describe situations where events are actively ‘made up’ in light of 
suggestions from others.  
This difference notwithstanding, fabulation shares with suggestibility a thoroughly 
paradoxical nature. In her research on the history of the concept of suggestibility 
within psychology, for example, Johanna Motzkau (2009) explored the paradoxical 
way in which it was viewed by early psychologists (William McDougal [1911], for 
example) as simultaneously an irrational expression of manipulability, and as perhaps 
the most fundamentally distinctive characteristic of human mentality and hence 
human nature: what makes learning, affection, socialization and social cohesion 
possible at all. As with the closely related theme of imitation (see Blackman, 2008), 
the suggestible self is inherently a social self that takes its cue from another, and yet it 
is only through such socialization that something like an ‘individual’, capable of 
rationally checking the evidence supporting the propositions s/he entertains, can ever 
emerge (see Stenner, 2017a).  
Fabulation shares this paradox of being simultaneously a highly valued activity 
associated with some of the peaks of human cultural achievement, and a lamentable 
pathology2. As it is used within the ‘psy’ sciences, however, we have seen that the 
                                                
2 In Bateson’s sense, this qualifies fabulation as something sacred. For Bateson (1975, p. 25), the 
sacred is ‘always a coin with two sides. The original Latin word “sacer,” from which we get out word, 
means both “so holy and pure” as to be sacred, and “so unholy and impure” as to be sacred. It’s as if 
there’s a scale – on the extreme pure end we have sacredness, then it swings down in the middle to the 
secular, the normal, the everyday, and then at the other end we again find the word “sacer” applied to 
the most impure, the most horrible’. The latter part of the current paper exploits this direct connection 
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concept loses this risky and paradoxical relationship with truth. More specifically, 
within these scientific uses, the concept of fabulation always presupposes an ideal and 
pre-given standard of truth, against which it can demonstrably fall short. Furthermore, 
in the case of the variations we have been considering, this standard typically rests 
upon the institutional epistemic norms, not just of science, but also of law (in the case 
of the suggestibility of witnesses) and medicine (in the case of psychiatric 
confabulation and medical somatisation). It is perhaps not surprising if the concept of 
fabulation loses its delicate and risky relation to truth in these hard institutional 
settings where it is defined as such only when demonstrably false in light of an 
objective standard provided by law, medicine or science.  
3. Fabulating a more risky relation to truth 
I can now return to what a concept of fabulation informed by Deleuze’s statement 
quoted above – ‘the ideal of the true was the most profound fiction, at the heart of the 
real’ – might look like. That is, a concept informed by the proposition that the ideal of 
the true, or the very best of the true, is something fictional. How can an ideal of the 
true, be at the heart of the real? To approach this risky mingling of ideal truth, fiction 
and reality we can begin quite modestly by grasping the important change, noted 
above, that Deleuze associates with ‘cinéma vérité’ (and its variants). The change 
inaugurated by cinéma vérité can be expressed negatively: it is not about using 
cinema to challenge fictional falsehoods, embellishments, ideologies and fantasies by 
confronting them with a pure filmic documentation of how things really are. It is not 
about contrasting ‘subjective’ fiction with a pre-established objective standard of 
truth. The ‘ideal of the truth’ that Deleuze has in mind does not involve contrasting an 
apparently external and material objectivity with an internal subjective representation. 
In fact, Deleuze associates just this effort (to use cinema to challenge fiction by 
contrasting it with a truth delivered by film) with an older form he calls the ‘cinema 
of reality’. He links this older form with the work of Flaherty, Grierson and Leacock. 
For Deleuze (1989, p. 149), the challenges to fiction posed by these directors were 
paradoxical in so far as they preserved an ideal of truth ‘which was dependent upon 
cinematic fiction itself’. In other words, cinematic fiction itself – inherited and 
preserved by the ‘cinema of reality’ – provided a neat separation between images 
corresponding to subject and object.  On the one hand, what the camera sees (beyond 
the purview of a given character) is taken as objective, and, on the other, what is seen 
to be seen by a given character is taken, by filmic convention, as subjective. Hence a 
film allows us to see what a character sees (subjective image) whilst also seeing what 
they do not see (objective image). This contrast creates rich potential for cinematic 
devices. For example, discrepancies between objective and subjective images can be 
used to constitute tensions and crises which can then be ‘resolved’ at the film’s finale. 
We can ‘feel for’ characters because we are placed in the omnipotent position of 
knowing both what they know and what they don’t know. When this discrepancy is 
resolved, some sort of ‘identity’ – the identity that was lost during the section of the 
film when subjective and objective were out of phase – is re-affirmed. Deleuze (ibid) 
refers to this identity in short hand using the formula: Ego = Ego. 
By exploiting this duality, the anti-fictional ‘cinema of reality’ effected the separation 
of two poles: a documentary pole and a reportage pole. At the documentary pole the 
                                                                                                                                      
between fabulation and the sacred by showing the origins of the concept in sociological discussions of 
religion. See also chapter 5 of Stenner (2017a).    
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cinema of reality can claim to objectively display the real actions of real people in real 
settings, and at the reportage pole it displays the subjective ‘ways of seeing’ of the 
characters, showing how they define their problems and issues from their own 
perspectives. This ‘cinema of reality’ retains clear identities for characters 
(subjective) and film makers (objective) alike, and it challenges fiction in favour of a 
reality captured in this way by cinema (‘Ego = Ego’). But since this reality is in fact 
captured by cinema, the model of truth it retains is a consequence of the very fiction it 
presupposes. In Deleuze’s account it was just this paradoxical model of truth – with 
its clear identities for characters and film makers alike – that was systematically 
unraveled by a number of film makers including Lang, Welles and Pasolini. Pasolini’s 
‘cinema of poetry’, for example, erodes and recomposes the distinction between 
objective and subjective images, creating a new form he calls ‘free indirect 
discourse’:  
 
In the cinema of poetry, the distinction between what the character saw 
subjectively and what the camera saw objectively vanished, not in favour of 
one or the other, but because the camera assumed a subjective presence, 
acquired an internal vision, which entered into a relation of simulation 
(‘mimesis’) with the character’s way of seeing. It is here… that Pasolini 
discovered how to go beyond the two elements of the traditional story, the 
objective, indirect story from the camera’s point of view, and the subjective, 
direct story, from the character’s point of view, to achieve the very special 
form of ‘a free indirect discourse’, of a ‘free, indirect subjective’. A 
contamination of the two kinds of image was established, so that bizarre 
visions of the camera (alternation of different lenses, zoom, extraordinary 
angles, abnormal movements, halts…) expressed the singular visions of the 
character, and the latter were expressed in the former, but by bringing the 
whole to the power of the false. The story no longer refers to an ideal of the 
true which constitutes its veracity, but becomes a ‘pseudo-story’, a poem, a 
story which simulates or rather a simulation of the story. (Deleuze, 1989, p. 
148-149)             
Cinema vérité takes off from this unravelling achieved by Lang, Welles and Pasolini 
and thus departs from the ‘cinema of reality’ with its clear identities of character and 
film-maker afforded by its (fictional) contrast of fiction with truth. The ideal truth it 
offers is not a truth contrasted with fiction but a fiction at the heart of the real.  In this 
process, the Ego=Ego scenario unravels and gives way to the transversal subjectivity 
of Ego=becoming other. In 1960 Rouch collaborated with the transdisciplinary 
sociologist Edgar Morin in the making of ‘Chronique d’un été’ (‘Chronicle of a 
summer’). No less anthropological than ‘Les Maîtres Fous’, this film involved the 
‘tribe’ of Parisians. It had no actors, script, plot or scenario, but simply involved 
walking the streets of Paris with a camera and microphone and inviting passers-by to 
respond to the question: ‘are you happy?’ This was not a matter of gaining access to 
an undisturbed external reality. Rouch and Morin were very aware that the presence 
of a camera, microphone, interviewer and so on were important ingredients in what 
happened during filming. Some people walked away, some said ‘buzz off’, whilst 
others talked freely about their joys and sorrows. These were not stories of realities 
that might have happened had the camera not been there, but of what happens because 
the camera is there. The camera is ingredient in a living reality in which human 
beings are not objects, but subjects of the film. The film makers, in other words, 
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considered the situation to be a kind of experiment in which ordinary people were 
invited to actively participate (or refuse to participate) in a real creation.   
In the same way, the question of the authenticity of The Mad Masters – whether it is a 
faithful depiction of real ritual practices or a show put on to please the pre-
conceptions of the inquisitive European visitors - is not, for Rouch and Deleuze, the 
pressing issue. The issue is the experimental creation of a ‘profound fiction at the 
heart of the real’: a ‘free indirect discourse’ in which fiction is freed from the 
representational model of truth (and image of thought) which would seek to eliminate 
it, and re-connected to the transformative powers of fabulation. At stake here is what 
Deleuze calls: 
 
the pure and simple story-telling function which is opposed to this model. 
What is opposed to fiction is not the real; it is not the truth which is always 
that of the masters or the colonizers; it is the story-telling function of the poor, 
in so far as it gives the false the power which makes it into a memory, a 
legend, a monster…  What cinema must grasp is not the identity of a 
character, whether real or fictional, through his objective and subjective 
aspects. It is the becoming of the real character when he himself starts to 
‘make fiction’, when he enters into the ‘flagrant offence of making up 
legends’ and so contributes to the invention of his people. (1989, p. 150)             
 
This activity of fabulation (the ‘story-telling-function’ or ‘making up legends’), far 
from affirming coherent identities, summons a zone of indiscernability between the 
‘characters’ and the ‘film maker’. Both are involved in a process of ‘making up’ in 
which who they are becomes inseparable from the before and the after of a ‘passage 
from one state to another’3. This passage enabled by fabulation, as Deleuze suggests, 
is not inconsequential, but of direct social relevance, since it ‘contributes to the 
invention’ of a people. Returning to our film, we can see that each of the ‘characters’ 
in The Mad Masters becomes another through the process of telling their story or 
making up their legend ‘without ever being fictional’. Magaria becomes Madame 
Salma just as the other men become Madame Lokotoro, the Corporal of the Guard, 
Gerba the conductor, Captain Malia and the Governor. But equally, Rouch the film 
maker ethnographer becomes with them. ‘With the camera to my eye, I am what 
Dziga Vertov called the mechanical eye… With a ciné-eye and a ciné-ear I am a ciné-
Rouch in a state of ciné-trance in the process of ciné-filming (Rouch, 1989, p. 268 
cited in Lim, 2002). Rouch becomes cyborgian ciné-Rouch as he fabulates a film 
which is itself a passage from a pre-liminary phase in which the workers are 
introduced and separated from their labours, through the liminal phase of the Hauka 
ritual, and culminating in the post-liminal re-incorporation back into working life. It 
might seem as if nothing has changed and that, after the Hauka, the workers and the 
film maker return to… ‘What they were before’ (Deleuze, 1989, p. 152). But, through 
this process, has not a new assemblage been formed between ritual and film, 
characters and film makers, perhaps even Gold Coast and Paris? As it acquires and 
transforms its audience, does the movie itself begin to fabulate in turn a ‘new people’? 
If so, then this is not a matter of a pre-established truth, faithfully or unfaithfully 
depicted by way of a ‘fiction’, but of new becoming, which sweeps up those involved 
                                                
3 For an application of this idea to novels - and Mann’s Magic Mountain in particular - see Stenner and 
Greco (2018). 
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into a new reality whose heart now beats to the pulse of the fabulation that supplies its 
truth.  
 
Not reality versus fiction, then, but a creative experimentation with what reality can 
become: an experimentation that activates a process of passage in which clear 
identities are scrambled as they melt down and are reconstituted. The ‘story telling’ 
does not reinforce and depend upon, but dissolves the very boundaries that constitute 
identities and structures and, in so doing, opens up the possibility of contributing ‘to 
the invention of [a] people’, even if that ‘people’ might not be even thought (as a 
possibility) yet.  It seems to me that Edgar Morin (1985, p.5) expresses precisely this 
connection between the vérité of this kind of cinematic practice, and a ‘quest’ for 
solidarity: ‘Can’t cinema become the means of breaking that membrane which 
isolates each of us from others in the metro, on the street, or on the stairway of the 
apartment building? The quest for a new cinéma vérité is at the same time a quest for 
a ‘cinéma de fraternite’.  
 
It is notable that, independently of Deleuze, the US literary critic Robert Scholes 
(1967) used the concept of fabulation to designate the new style of a specific group of 
Anglophone novelists. This group, which Scholes calls The Fabulators includes 
Vonnegut, Durrell, Hawkes, Murdoch, Barth, Golding and Navakov4. What is striking 
here is that the shift in literary approach examined by Scholes was contemporary with 
the new style of cinema that Deleuze associates with Rouch, Perrault, Clarke and 
Cassavetes, and, most significantly, shares with it the theme of a transformed relation 
between fiction and truth. Scholes work in the field of literature can in this sense be 
viewed as homologous to Deleuze’s work on cinema. Scholes’ fabulators depart from 
realistic and conventionally romantic fictional concepts by deliberately blurring the 
lines between artifice and reality, often through the device of dislocating time and 
space. Scholes shows how their work shares certain features such as ‘black humour’, 
the revival of rhetoric, and a questioning of certainties, and yet he discerns a universal 
‘vision’ which stems from what he describes as a collision of myth and philosophy 
(their style can also be compared to ‘magical realism’).  
 
Just as Rouch set up a transversal connection between anthropology and film, Scholes 
connects the new vision of fiction associated with fabulation to core developments in 
20th Century science (relativity theory, quantum theory, systems theory, structuralism, 
etc.). In the work of the fabulists ‘the tradition of speculative fiction is modified by an 
awareness of the nature of the universe as a system of systems, a structure of 
structures, and the insights of the past century of science are accepted as fictional 
points of departure ... It is a fictional exploration of human situations made 
perceptible by the implications of recent science’ (Scholes, 1967, p. 54–55). 
Furthermore, as pointed out in a later work (Scholes, 1976, p. 47), the fabulators write 
‘fiction that offers us a world clearly and radically discontinuous from the one we 
know, yet returns to confront that known world in some cognitive way’. 
 
I have sketched a contrast between two very different concepts of fabulation, each 
associated with a very different image of thought and a very different ‘ideal of the 
true’. On the one hand, we have a psychological construction of fabulation which is 
substantially similar to that at play in the ‘cinema of reality’, both of which operate 
                                                
4 Barr (1992) importantly extends this analysis in a feminist direction. 
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with an ideal of truth that depends upon objective epistemic norms, whether those be 
the institutional norms of science, law, medicine or the internal conventions of cinema 
itself. This version of fabulation is precisely denied the sort of delicate and risky 
relation to truth that is the characteristic feature of the other version that Deleuze finds 
at the heart of ‘cinéma vérité’ and that Scholes associates with the group of novelists 
he calls ‘fabulators’. For this alternative version, fabulation is not a subjective 
distortion of reality but a means to grasp and enact new becomings. This second 
version gives a significant place to artistic creativity and precisely does not rest upon 
the secure foundation of an institutionally or scientifically grounded objectivity: 
 
It’s the greatest artists (rather than populist artists) who invoke a people, and 
they find they “lack a people”: Mallarmé, Rimbaud, Klee, Berg. The Straubs 
in cinema. Artists can only invoke a people, their need for one goes to the very 
heart of what they’re doing, it’s not their job to create one, and they can’t. Art 
is resistance: it resists death, slavery, infamy, shame. But a people can’t worry 
about art. How is a people created, through what terrible suffering? When a 
people’s created, it’s through its own resources, but in a way that links up with 
something in art . . . or in such a way that art (Garrel says there’s a mass of 
terrible suffering in the Louvre too) or links up art to what it lacked. Utopia 
isn’t the right concept: it’s more a question of a “fabulation” in which a people 
and art both share. We ought to take up Bergson’s notion of fabulation and 
give it a political meaning (Deleuze, 1990, p.1).  
 
4. Society and the sacred: Durkheim’s influence on Bergson  
In the quotation above Deleuze refers to ‘Bergson’s notion of fabulation’ as a 
potentially more useful concept than utopia for getting at this nexus of issues around 
art, suffering, resistance and the capacity to invoke and create ‘a people’. A utopia is 
the imagination of a kind of blue-print for a desired community or society, but 
‘fabulation’ points to a more messy, liminal and un-predetermined process of 
transformative passage. As Deleuze implies, the concept of fabulation more readily 
opens up a set of questions around how art might contribute to these political efforts 
(Braidotti, 2000). But, as we shall see, the concept notably emerges from debates 
about the origins of religion and the sacred, pointing to a zone of indiscernability 
between the aesthetic and the sacred (see Stenner, 2017b). A moment’s reflection 
shows that we have wandered into territory that is a profoundly transdisciplinary 
mixture of art, politics, religion, psychology, philosophy, anthropology and, as we 
shall see, historical sociology. Much of Bergson’s philosophy, as Deleuze (1986, 
preface) points out, ‘was the diagnosis of a crisis in psychology’, but even if his 
concept of fabulation contributes to early critical psychology, it appears in a book 
called The two sources of morality and religion (Bergson, 1932). This book can be 
well considered as a transdisciplinary sociology designed to explain the emergence of 
religion.  
To understand Deleuzian fabulation and Bergson’s aim in the Two sources, it is first 
important to grasp Bergson’s relation to Durkheim. As a convenient simplification of 
this relation, we might contrast the transdisciplinary and processual thought of 
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Bergson with the disciplinarian thought of Durkheim5. The two studied together at a 
prestigious Parisian school and Bergson even named Durkheim as his principal 
adversary (Belloy, 2002, cited in Lefebvre and White, 2010). Riley (2002) shows 
quite how defining the Bergson/Durkheim concern with the sacred was for 20th 
Century French social theory (including postmodernism), and Lefebvre and White 
(2010, p. 458) make a compelling case that Bergson’s ‘Two Sources is written in 
response to Durkheim’, and specifically to Durkheim’s last and most important book 
The elementary forms of religious life (1912). Like any interesting rivalry, this one 
involved a combination of commonality of goal and difference of approach. The 
common goal was nothing small: to reinvent the religious sacred for modern times 
(Riley, 2002, p. 244). The differences were subtle but significant. As we shall see, a 
concept of fabulation (or Durkheim’s equivalent, ‘idealization’) was at the centre of 
both efforts to explain and rescue the sacred.  
The significance of ‘idealizing’ within Durkheim’s elementary forms 
Ultimately, Durkheim repeats the gesture, that I have described in Section 2 above, of 
disciplining a subjective perspective by way of an objective standard. As with 
Deleuze’s description of the ‘cinema of reality’, Durkheim begins by describing 
religious experiences in terms acceptable to believers (equivalent to Deleuze’s 
subjective ‘reportage pole’) and proceeds to explain that experience from the vantage 
point of sociological objectivity (the ‘documentary pole’). The believer is credited 
with a genuine experience of the sacred, but Durkheim goes on to show how they fail 
to grasp that their sacred is really the distortion of a precious representation of society 
(‘collective representation’). Durkheim thinks he has discovered a law that 
simultaneously explains religion, proves the pure autonomy of the social, and 
guarantees the scientificity of sociology as the highest of all sciences. For Durkheim 
(1912, p. 333) it is ‘axiomatic that religious beliefs, as odd as they sometimes seem, 
have a truth that must be discovered.’ The truth that Durkheim unveils is that the 
sacred is society itself and that society itself is sacred.   
The revelation of sociology as the empirical science of the sacred is part of a 
thoroughly disciplinary strategy. At its basis is Durkheim’s insistence that the concept 
of the social (and hence the subject matter of sociology) be kept pure and sacrosanct, 
not just by radically distinguishing it from the psychological and the biological, but 
also by insisting upon its superior and indeed totalising nature. Durkheim insists that 
the sacred/social is superimposed upon the mundane real as an ideal to which the 
individual rightly ‘ascribes a kind of higher dignity’ (1912, p. 317). For Durkheim 
society is this higher reality beyond the individual that emerges into communicable 
experience only through a process of ‘idealization’. As ‘soon as we recognize that 
above the individual there is society, and that society is a system of active forces – not 
a nominal or rationally created being – a new way of explaining man becomes 
possible’ (p. 343). Durkheim never ceases insisting upon this purified concept of the 
social which makes of sociology a sacred science and of him its prophet.  
Durkheim’s well known premise is that facts are social facts only if they existed 
before and outside of the psychobiological individual, and only if they ‘penetrate us 
by imposing themselves on us’: only if an external constraint ‘forcibly prescribes’ 
                                                
5 See Riley (2002, p. 7) for other ways of classifying the two thinkers. 
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them and they ‘sweep us along in spite of ourselves’ (1895, p. 52-53).6 Sociology, in 
affirming the distinctly societal origins of the sacred, allows a new account of the 
sacred value of society. Unlike most religious accounts, Durkheim’s does not require 
an unobservable ‘supra-experiential reality’ (Durkheim, 1912, p. 342), but is 
grounded in actual occasions of experience. Durkheim’s core idea that the sacred is 
society conceived symbolically is taken from William Robertson Smith (1894, p. 264-
5) who wrote that every act of worship expresses ‘the idea that man does not live for 
himself only but also for his fellows, and that this partnership of social interests is the 
sphere over which the gods preside’. Robertson Smith also stressed the importance of 
occasions of experience in which ‘the whole community [is] stirred by a common 
emotion’ and Durkheim applied this insight in what is perhaps his best known 
argument: that the sacred/social is actually experienced during occasions of collective 
emotional ‘effervescence’. The paradigmatic instance here is ritual. The Hauka ritual 
with which we began provides a good example of a situation in which ‘Man does not 
recognise himself; he feels he is transformed’ (Durkheim, 1912, p. 317).  Effectively, 
this is Durkheim’s way of grasping how a people, a society, might be invented, or 
better, how it is possible to have a concrete experience of ‘society’ that can 
thenceforth serve as the basic representation a collective has of itself, qua collective.  
Durkheim, for good reason, ascribes fundamental importance to this idea that ‘when 
collective life reaches a certain degree of intensity it awakens religious thought, 
because it determines a state of effervescence that changes the conditions of psychic 
activity… vital energies become overstimulated, passions more powerful, sensations 
stronger’ (ibid). These are social facts because such experiences are not possible 
alone, but also, they are the basis from which a higher, ‘ideal’ world – Durkheim’s 
world of society – is superimposed upon the supposed profane psychobiological life 
of individuals. Society, once strictly separated from psychology and biology (assumed 
to be individual) ‘wields a creative power that no palpable being can equal’ (1912, p. 
342), and yet our grasp of it is necessarily distorted by the very conditions (of 
collective effervescence) under which we encounter it in collective experience. This 
experience, despite the disciplinarian strategy, thus carries a risky relation to truth 
since it is simultaneously the most profound truth of which we are capable (society 
really does exist beyond the individual), and something veiled in distorting 
mythology. The collective effervescence, for example, is ‘the experience man is 
interpreting when he imagines malevolent beings outside himself whose hostility, 
inherent or provisional, can be disarmed only by human suffering’ (p. 307). Out of the 
clinging mist of the experience of collective effervescence, in short, the shapes of 
gods and demons, angels and satyrs, are vaguely discerned. Collective effervescence, 
we might say, is the material from which gods are fabulated. This, essentially, is 
Durkheim’s sociological alternative to the postulation of what he calls a ‘natural 
faculty for idealizing, that is for substituting for the world of reality a different world 
to which he is transported by thought’ (p. 316).  
Bergson’s faculty of fabulation 
 
                                                
6 Durkheim’s ‘evidence’ is presented in a startlingly authoritarian way: ‘it is sufficient to observe how 
children are brought up. If one views the facts as they are and indeed as they have always been, it is 
patently obvious that all education consists of a continual effort to impose upon the child ways of 
seeing, thinking and acting which he himself would not have arrived at spontaneously’ (1895, p.53).  
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Twenty years later, Bergson retained some of these insights, but construed them quite 
differently. This ‘natural faculty for idealizing’ – freed from Durkheim’s 
sociologising framework – is precisely Bergson’s faculty of fabulation. I am 
suggesting that to ‘idealize’ (to use Durkheim’s word) is to fabulate (to use 
Bergson’s). It is to double reality with a superimposed ideal and thus to create an 
ideal of the true that, once superimposed, functions as a fiction at the core of the real. 
The difference behind this commonality is the way of answering the question of 
‘where this idealization comes from’ (Durkheim, 1912 p. 316). What sort of actual 
occasion of experience promotes it? For Durkheim, as we have seen, it derives from, 
and is renewed by, a type of emotionally heightened social occasion of experience 
which both comes from and is ‘society’ par excellence and sui generis. Pure society 
must have no intercourse with psychology or biology. Bergson refuses this absolute 
divide and rejects any tendency to ‘regard the individual as an abstraction, and the 
social body as the one reality’ (1932, p. 105). For Bergson ‘the individual and society 
are implied in each other: individuals make up society by their grouping together; 
society shapes an entire side of individuals by being prefigured in each one of them. 
The individual and society thus condition each other, circle-wise.’ (p. 199). Thus 
when Bergson describes his faculty of fabulation, he emphasises its biological and 
psychological aspects and – to strike directly at Durkheim’s Achilles’ heel – he gives 
examples which are precisely not social in Durkheim’s sense.   
 
His most memorable example concerns a lady on the upper floor of a hotel who 
wished to descend to the lower level. Observing the gate of the hotel lift to be open, 
she hurried to enter. But a fault had occurred and the gate was open despite the fact 
that the lift was still far below. As she rushed forward:  
 
she felt herself flung backwards, the man entrusted with the working of the lift 
had just appeared and was pushing her back onto the landing. At this point she 
emerged from her fit of abstraction. She was amazed to see that neither man 
nor lift was there… She had been about to fling herself into the gaping void; a 
miraculous hallucination had saved her life. (p.120).  
This fabulation is clearly not a social occasion of collective effervescence, since the 
lady was alone. Equally clearly, it is not just ‘making things up’ but inventing or 
hallucinating images at an opportune moment as a defensive reaction. The lady 
fabulated automatically in the face of a void and this little drama averted a far worse 
crisis. Bergson is thus inviting us to view the lady’s imaginary lift-attendant as a 
fabulation no different in principle to an angel, a muse, or a god: ‘Just now, before the 
open gate a guardian appeared, to bar the way and drive back the trespasser’ (p. 122). 
Another example he gives is of William James’s experience of an earthquake, 
whereby James reported inadvertently personifying the geological event with quasi-
human features. Bergson’s emphasis, in short, is not on the social nature of the 
occasion of significant experience, but on its nature as a more or less shocking event. 
‘How is it’, Bergson asks, ‘that psychologists have not been struck by the mysterious 
element in a faculty such as this?’ (p. 196).  
 
Consistent with his psychological focus (which does not exclude the social, but 
prevents Durkheim’s ‘top down’ social dictation), Bergson proposes an evolutionary 
function explaining the existence of this faculty. Essentially, fabulation is nature’s 
way of guarding against dangers introduced by the newfound intelligence of our 
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ancestors: their newly evolved intellectual faculties of judgement and reason. 
Intelligence is corrosive of any social order held together by biological instinct and 
unquestioned habit. The intelligent beast pursues rational self-interest and would 
reject the irrational demands for collective obligation, were it not for the co-evolution 
of fabulation. At crucial junctures – where crises might regularly occur – fabulations 
immunise humanity against the unexpected side-effects of its own powers of 
intelligence. Thanks to fabulation, phantasmic images and incipient hallucinations 
arise in the mind to intercept and counteract the direction in which an intellectual train 
of thought would otherwise take the thinker. If intelligence pursues only facts, the 
faculty of fabulation responds by generating counterfeit facts of experience which, 
serving as ‘virtual-instincts’, prevent us from sliding into anarchic disorder. The 
sociological benefit of fabulation is thus the salvaging of social order. The cost is that 
the social order that has been won is a backwards-and-inwards looking form that 
depends on the irrational stock of images and myths that Bergson calls static morality 
and religion. Having identified the faculty of fabulation as the source of our 
traditional religious imagery and stories, Bergson is able to define static religion 
rather emphatically as ‘a defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent power of 
intelligence’ (p. 131). 
 
Bergson’s process philosophy emphatically rejects Durkheim’s fundamental dualism 
between individual and society along with related dualisms like body/mind. The 
future of psychology, he suggests, (p. 105) ‘depends on the way it first dissects its 
object’. But this also applies to sociology, and indeed any science. To follow the 
natural joints, Bergson proposes a transdisciplinary distinction between a static nature 
oriented towards its own conservation (which he associates with abstraction, habit and 
all things mechanical and spatial), and a dynamically creative nature expressing an 
ever-emerging vitality (which he associates with intuition and process). This allows 
him to avoid Durkheim’s tendency to construe organic nature as mechanical repetition 
in contrast to society’s ideal obligations. Biology and psychology too can be static 
and dynamic. Nevertheless, Bergson invariably celebrates the ‘dynamic’ side 
associated with creation, invention and intuition. In discussing intelligence, for 
instance, he celebrates the ‘intelligence which invents’ over and above that which 
merely ‘understands, discusses, accepts or rejects – which, in a word, limits itself to 
criticism’ (p. 45). When discussing emotion he distinguishes a static and ‘infra-
intellectual’ type with which the ‘psychologist is generally concerned’ (p. 44) from a 
dynamic and ‘supra-intellectual’ type, which alone is ‘productive of ideas’ and ‘the 
source of the great creations of art, of science and of civilization in general’ (p. 43). 
Put abstractly, on the one hand, we have an open ‘active, moving principle’ of ‘freely 
creative energy’ and on the other, the closed ‘matter’ which is merely the more or less 
refractory vehicle for this moving energy. It is as if the former were an electric current 
running through the latter. Different animal species are, from the perspective of 
creative evolution, merely resting points at which this ‘great current of creative 
energy… came to a stop’ (p. 209). From this perspective, an organism is relatively 
‘closed’ like a ‘footprint, which instantly causes a myriad grains of sand to cohere and 
form a pattern’ (ibid). One footprint is, of course, just a step towards the next on an 
‘open’ journey.  
 
When Bergson contrasts closed and open societies, then, he links those types to 
psychological and biological dimensions. Thus the static religion that generates closed 
societies has its source in a psychological faculty of fabulation which results from 
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organic evolution, always in societal context. Closed societies use the benign trickery 
of fabulated ‘virtual instincts’ to conserve their solidarity. Static morality and religion 
are ultimately negative in that they dull our emergent intelligence by telling humanity 
‘tales on a par with those with which we lull children to sleep’ (p. 211).  Religious 
fabulations are not just nice ideas, but ‘ideo-motory’ constructions which, à la 
Durkheim, demand our unquestioning practical compliance. The strong implication 
from Bergson is that Durkheim’s entire theory of society remains static. The open 
society is something different. It is Bergson’s way of rescuing the sacred. Dynamic 
religion flows, not from the faculty of fabulation, but from intuition. It is not based on 
imposition but on a mystical love with its source in a direct grasp of the universe, 
enabled by intuition, as this unified and ever-moving flux of creative energy.  
 
Only the mystic is capable of this intuition, but the mystic can influence all. For 
Bergson the human mind is limited by its need to transform the real flux into 
recognisable spatially located objects-for-mundane-use. For this reason, the daily 
material world is more like a curtain between mundane humanity and a higher truth. 
What we perceive – the world of matter that has been spatialized – is just a veil7. The 
mystic sees the dynamic process beyond the static veil. This vision promises the 
invention of an open society tolerant of a higher quantity and quality of ‘creative 
energy’. Bergson is the mystic with a soul sufficiently strong to ‘feel itself pervaded, 
though retaining its own personality, by a being immeasurably mightier than itself, 
just as an iron is pervaded by the fire which makes it glow’ (p. 212). With its mystic 
source, a dynamic religion would transfigure static religion and open the closed 
society. The bonds between individual, society and life would be re-energised by a 
joyful affirmation of mutual participation in the creative process of nature. No longer 
habitually attached to the illusory materiality of particular things, citizens would 
celebrate life-as-such. No longer attached by partisan commitments to local groups, 
they would identify with humanity as a whole (p. 268). 
 
5. The fabled philosopher: the blocked and unblocked passages of Deleuzian 
fabulation 
Returning to the Bergson/Durkheim relation has allowed us to appreciate the scope of 
the concept of fabulation and its tight connection to the problem of the emergence of 
the sacred-social. Both thinkers fabulate a new image of society and the sacred which 
they hope is capable of sustaining and integrating future humanity. Durkheim’s is a 
disciplinary fabulation. Thanks to sociology, an ever more totalising society can be 
‘progressively purified’ of the ‘subjective elements’ of pre-modern religion (p. 340). 
This purification process will yield a ‘supreme’ and ‘dominating’ trans-personal force 
that truly deserves the total obedience that, for Durkheim, all social facts demand of 
individuals: ‘the concept of totality is merely the abstract form of the concept of 
society: it is the whole that includes all things, the supreme classification’ (Durkheim, 
                                                
7 In editing this article, Maria Nichterlein made the following insightful connection to a comment from 
Bateson (in his 1958 epilogue to Naven) on A.N. Whitehead and B. Russell. Bateson wrote of ‘a well-
known story about the philosopher Whitehead. His former pupil and famous collaborator, Bertrand 
Russell, came to visit Harvard and lectured in the large auditorium on quantum theory, always a 
difficult subject, and at that time a comparatively novel theory. Russell labored to make the matter 
intelligible to the distinguished audience, many of whom were unversed in the ideas of mathematical 
physics. When he sat down, Whitehead rose as chairman to thank the speaker. He congratulated 
Russell on his brilliant exposition “and especially on leaving … unobscured … the vast darkness of the 
subject”’. 
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1912, p. 337). In Bergson’s transdisciplinary fabulation, by contrast, the vitalist vision 
of the mystic will usher in the open society of globally flowing interconnected love. 
We will take our rightful place – as a unified part of the immanent whole of nature-in-
process – in ‘the essential function of the universe, which is a machine for the making 
of gods’ (1932, p. 317).  
 
In light of the above, Deleuzian fabulation can be sketched out via a double 
comparison. The first is a comparison with Bergson’s concept. Deleuze writes little 
about religion8, and the focus of his concept of fabulation is on art (cinema, literature, 
painting). But Deleuze’s ‘artistic fabulation’ clearly expresses Bergson’s mystic 
vision of the universe as a surging tide of freely creative vital energy that ‘shows up’ 
temporarily as an array of objectified entities. In this sense, while consistent with it in 
other ways, Deleuze contradicts Bergson’s argument that intuition is the source of this 
vision, and precisely not fabulation. For Deleuze, genuine art plays a politico-
therapeutic role of releasing life from its static, blocked forms. As Deleuze puts it, the 
act of writing is ‘an attempt to make life something more than personal, to free life 
from what imprisons it’ (1995, p.142–3). The ways of living depicted in literature are 
taken by Deleuze as symptoms of how vital life might gush forth or get blocked-up or 
drain away. The death mask of the personal, from this perspective, is one aspect of the 
illness that literature aims to diagnose and cure. For Deleuze literature is not an effort 
to impose form on lived experience but a means through which it ‘escapes its own 
formalization’ (1998, p. 1). Great literature thus has nothing to do with recounting 
‘one’s memories and travels, one’s loves and griefs, one’s dreams and fantasies’ (p. 
2). These are the travels, griefs and fantasies of the very person that literature aims to 
dissolve into a becoming other9. Only a neurotic notion of art revolves around the 
‘personal’, forever seeking a reassuring daddy-mommy to fix one’s form and to blot 
out the call of the wild, vital energy.  Just as the cinema that Deleuze celebrates serves 
to replace the ‘Ego = Ego’ formula with ‘Ego = becoming’, so literature ‘is a question 
of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes 
beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience’ (p. 1). Literature begins, not 
                                                
8 In Desert Islands, Deleuze (2004, p.11) suggests that ‘rites and mythology’ are the most profound 
aspects of the collective imagination, and indeed that literature is ‘the attempt to interpret, in an 
ingenious way, the myths we no longer understand, at the moment we no longer understand them, since 
we no longer know how to dream them or reproduce them’ (p.12). In the same essay he also evokes the 
theme of the sacred: ‘humans do not put an end to desertedness, they make it sacred. Those people who 
come to the island indeed occupy and populate it; but in reality, were they sufficiently separate, 
sufficiently creative, they would give the island only a dynamic image of itself, a consciousness of the 
movement which produced the island, such that through them the island would in the end become 
conscious of itself as deserted and unpeopled’ (p.10). 
9 This notion of becoming other is key to Deleuze and also to Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 272), for 
whom becomings other always follow a minoritarian trajectory towards maximal molecularity: ‘A kind 
of order or apparent progression can be established for the segments of becoming in which we find 
ourselves; becoming-woman, becoming-child; becoming-animal, -vegetable, or –mineral; becomings 
molecular of all kinds, becoming particles. Fibers lead us from one to the other, transform one into the 
other as they pass through doors and across thresholds. Singing or composing, painting, writing have 
no other aim: to unleash these becomings’. For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 291) insist 
that there is ‘no becoming-man’ (p.291). In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Hauka ritual 
depicted in ‘Les Maîtres Fous’ does indeed appear to involve becomings that move from minoritarian 
(subjugated black) to majoritarian (colonialising white). So long as we do not mistake becoming for the 
simple imitation of a molar subject, this deviation from Deleuze and Guattari’s order might provide an 
interesting clue for a fresh interpretation of ‘Les Maîtres Fous’ in terms of fabulation. Here, I merely 
wish to note the direct connection between fabulation and becoming: ‘There is a reality of becoming-
animal, even though one does not in reality become animal’ (p. 273).  
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with the personal ‘I’, but only when we are stripped ‘of the power to say “I”’ (p. 3). It 
is only as becoming that art can feed into the political becoming of a minoritarian 
people to come.  
Deleuze’s encounter with Bergson, therefore, does not leave Bergsonism unchanged. 
He famously confessed that he viewed ‘the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery 
or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an 
author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet 
monstrous. It was really important for it to be his own child, because the author had to 
actually say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, 
because it resulted from all the shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions 
that I really enjoyed’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 6). Deleuze gives such a distinctive meaning 
to Bergson’s fabulation that, when reading the following words, it is hard not to see 
Gilles approaching Henri from behind: ‘There is no literature without fabulation, but 
as Bergson was able to see, fabulation – the fabulating function – does not consist in 
imagining or projecting an ego. Rather, it attains these visions, it raises itself to these 
becomings and powers’ (Deleuze, 1998, p. 3).  For Bergson, as we saw, fabulation 
can never raise itself to the mystic vision, since it is always a matter of conjuring an 
opportune falsehood to avert some crisis. Bergson even insists that ‘the mistake is to 
believe that it is possible to pass, by a mere process of enlargement or improvement, 
from the static to the dynamic, from… fabulation… to intuition’ (1932, p. 269). In 
gently unblocking this passage, Deleuze relieves Bergson’s philosophy of the need to 
fabulate two distinct ‘faculties’, and implicitly unifies fabulation and intuition within 
a concept of the event, itself partly Bergsonian. An event ruptures prior causality and 
chronology and – in precipitating the disconcerting and ego-dissolving visions of 
fabulation – opens a new set of possibilities for becoming other. Deleuze precisely 
values the disconcerting visions produced by fabulation, since, for him, these can 
form the basis of works of art through which new political possibilities are created.  
 
Albeit implicitly, Deleuze gives a similar treatment to Durkheim, and this is our 
second comparison. Certainly Deleuze sides with Bergson’s critique, and prefers 
Tarde’s ‘molecular’ sociology to Durkheim’s ‘molar’ conception of a purified social 
(see Riley, 2002, p.16). But compared to Bergson, who lays stress upon the psycho-
biological to refute his rival, Deleuze wants precisely to grasp the sociological and, 
more precisely, political contribution fabulation makes to what he calls ‘the invention 
of [a] people’. In this respect he shares Durkheim’s fascination with those occasions 
in which ‘Man does not recognise himself; he feels he is transformed’ (Durkheim, 
1912, p.317). These experiences of ‘collective effervescence’ are the ‘regions of 
intensity’ in which the ‘body without organs’ is encountered and assembled on a 
‘plane of immanence’. But where Durkheim reaches always for the pristine collective 
representation emerged fully-formed in its purity like Aphrodite from a sea-shell, 
Deleuze returns us to the murky event of emergence itself. Deleuze (1990) doubtless 
had Durkheim in mind when he said: ‘What I've been interested in are collective 
creations rather than representations’. In this sense, fabulation, as I have further 
discussed elsewhere (Stenner, 2017a), is the passage from transformative event to 
communicable intuition. The event as pure actuality of becoming is unstable, 
ambiguous, volatile and unfinished, and it veers unpredictably now towards a static 
fascism and now towards a progressive dynamism. But it contains the seeds of a 
‘profound fiction, at the heart of the real’. As Deleuze warns, literature ‘is delirium, 
and as such its destiny is played out between the two poles of delirium. Delirium is a 
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disease, the disease par excellence, whenever it erects a race it claims is pure and 
dominant. But it is the measure of health when it evokes this oppressed bastard race 
that ceaselessly stirs beneath dominations’ (1998, p. 4). 
6. Conclusion 
Through fabulation, Deleuze’s thinking about art implicitly reconnects with the 
question of the sacred (and hence my choice to begin with the controversial cine-
Hauka ceremony). If writing is about becoming, and warrants a concept of fabulation, 
then perhaps this is a function of the extent to which it approximates the experience of 
the sacred at play in rites of passage. Perhaps literature is an ingenious attempt to 
interpret, not just ‘the myths we no longer understand’, but also the rituals we no 
longer understand ‘since we no longer know how to dream them ((Deleuze, 2004, 
p.12). Perhaps this is why Deleuze insists that the closer writing comes to becoming, 
the more it destroys itself as writing, and the more it approximates a vision. In the 
work of a great writer, language is ‘toppled or pushed to a limit, to an outside or 
reverse side that consists of Visions and Auditions that no longer belong to any 
language’ (Deleuze, 1998, p. 5).  The language of the writer thus ‘seems to be seized 
by a delirium, which forces it out of its usual furrows’ (ibid). Antonin Artaud 
understood this process better than most and saw it as the vocation of true theatre: ‘To 
shatter language in order to contact life means creating or recreating theatre’ (1974, p. 
6). All of these features can be understood as a certain becoming ritual of literature 
and cinema. And yet, in pointing to a zone of indiscernability between religious ritual, 
mythology and the arts, we must nevertheless attend to the specificities of the arts 
which precisely do not entail the total collective participation typical of rituals. Once 
individuated from their ritual matrix, theatre, painting, literature and indeed cinema 
presuppose a distinction between the sacred and the aesthetic. The aesthetic implies 
an audience for the product of an artistic creation whose process may be very lonely 
and – since art deals with that which is at the edge of semantic availability – may even 
veer close to madness. Fabulations, as Rosi Braidotti (2000, p. 170-1) suggests, propel 
becomings by bringing the unthinkable into representation.  We thus grasp their 
connection to mysticism defined as ‘insight into depths as yet unspoken’ (Whitehead, 
1938, p. 237).  
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